Coolfer has a defense of the the Live Nation/Ticketmaster integration here. It’s worth reading to get an iconoclastic and business-minded take on the issue, though I dont’ agree with it all. But he does say something (which I’ve boldfaced below) that doesn’t get acknowledged enough:

Some would agree that dynamic pricing — which would capture the maximum amount of value the market places on the tickets — would be a good thing for ticketing. Prices vary with demand. Low demand means lower price. High demand means a higher price. (That’s already the case. The most in-demand concerts tend to cost the most. Want a cheap concert? There are plenty of small clubs that charge $10 to see a good touring band.)

In fact, the existing secondary market—online sellers, ticket brokers, scalpers on the street, people on Craigslist—already creates something of a dynamic pricing system.

This is an important issue because it’s at the heart of the new Live Nation’s motivation, though the company can’t really get away with saying it: Why should the scalpers get the full inherent value of the  tickets? Madonna has too much money, sure, is moribund artistically, and a slightly ludicrous figure to boot. But, if she’s putting on a show that, via a scalper, fans are willing to pay many hundreds of dollars for the best seats to, shouldn’t she get that money?*

Elsewhere, I don’t really accept in the larger sense that concert tickets are economically analogous to airline seats. In a vague way one could say that the number of seats available to fly from Nashville to Des Moines, say, over a particular weekend is limited, but only if you view the needs of the folks that might take the flight as inflexible. And it ignores the issue of competition among airlines, which in theory will adjust to demand. Those wanting to see Kenny Chesney at a certain venue realistically have no flexibility, and there’s certainly no competition. (There’s not another company offering a Chesney show that weekend.)

Coolfer’s conclusion:

People are fearing worse-case and, I believe, unlikely scenarios. If Live Nation Entertainment truly wants to stay away from antitrust regulators, if it desires to return value to its shareholders, it will happily make money from selling its ticketing services to its competitors. Better to keep its competitors close than to force them to act in competition (by, for example, creating their own competing ticketing system). The same argument applies for feared favoritism to Front Line artists. Nothing should make a company so happy as to generate ticketing and related revenues from artists managed by other companies. There aren’t enough Front Line clients to support the concert industry. Live Nation Entertainment’s success will be greatly determined by the successes of acts managed by others.

* Hitsville’s position, as I’ve said before, is that artists should be able to set the price they want (even dynamically determined, if that’s what they want) for their shows; that they can then take the heat from fans for the price; and that reselling tickets at a profit should be illegal.

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Previously in Hitsville:
How Live Nation does business, II
Ticketmaster shareholders sue to stop merger
How Live Nation does business
Will the Live Nation/Ticketmaster merger mean higher concert prices?
Another suit against Ticketmaster
Constantly updated: The Ticketmaster-Live-Nation unholy-matrimony news round-up!
Five arguments against the Live Nation/Ticketmaster merger
Irving Azoff kicks it old school
The music industry’s Putin
Bad merger coverage
WWBD (What would Bono do?)
Billboard’s analysis of the Ticketmaster/Live Nation merger
Springsteen and Landau bash Ticketmaster and Live Nation!
P.S. on Ticketmaster: A case study, starring Bruce Springsteen
Why the potential Live Nation-Ticketmaster merger is a very bad idea
Is Ticketmaster trying to muddle the fees issue?
The Azoff-Ticketmaster deal: Bad news for concert-goers—and the music industry
Why you so seldom read about obscene Ticketmaster-style ticketing charges